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ABSTRACT 
The debate concerning administrative justice in the UK often involves reliance upon a certain 
set of values. Examples of such values include openness, confidentiality, timeliness, 
transparency, secrecy, fairness, efficiency, accountability, user-friendliness, consistency, 
participation, rationality, and equal treatment. These values are often deployed, both in 
academic and policy contexts, without much precision. This produces confusion which can 
hamper debate. This article therefore argues there is a need to reflect on how these oft-
used values are deployed, and consider the particular concerns which underlie them. In this 
sense, this article suggests there is a need to refine the grammar of administrative justice. 
This argument is demonstrated through an extended analysis of tŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ  ?ƵƐĞƌ-
ĨƌŝĞŶĚůŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?a site of emerging disagreement in recent years. It proposes that an important 
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶŵƵƐƚďĞĚƌĂǁŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞ ?ƚŚĞ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ?ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌist ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐ ? This article concludes by suggesting that, going forward, it is 
important to consider whether the use of abstractions is helpful at all in administrative law 
and justice debates. 
 
KEYWORDS  
Administrative justice; administrative law; public law; values; grammar; rationalism; 
abstraction; user-focus. 
 
The values of administrative justice 
 
In December 1998, Martin Partington, a central figure in the development of the modern 
study of administrative justice, gave a lecture RQWKHWRSLFRIµ5HVWUXFWXULQJ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH
-XVWLFH¶ at University College London (Partington 1999). In one part of the lecture he 
FRQWHQGHGWKDWDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHRXJKWWREHXQGHUVWRRGDVDµVLQJOHFRQFHSWHPEUDFLQJ
WZRFRQFHSWXDOO\GLVWLQFWDVSHFWV¶+HODEHOHGWKHVHWZRDVSHFWVWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN¶
DQG µSULQFLSOHV DQG YDOXHV¶ %\ WKH ILUVW RI WKHVH WHUPV KH UHIHUUHG WR µDOO WKRVH WLHUV RI
decision-WDNLQJ¶µREYLRXVO\«WKHFRXUWV¶WULEXQDOVLQTXLULHVRPEXGVPHQDQGWKHµYarious 
RWKHUERGLHV¶LQYROYHGLQ the delivery of government services. When referring to µSULQFLSOHV
and vaOXHV¶KHVSRNHRIKRZDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHµLPSOLHVLPSRUWDQWVHWVRISULQFLSOHVDQG
values, which must be considered as part of the conceptual framework¶. Examples of such 
µYDOXHV DQG SULQFLSOHV¶ that Partington notes are openness, confidentiality, transparency, 
secrecy, fairness, efficiency, accountability, consistency, participation, rationality, equity, and 
equal treatment. Other common examples include timeliness, courtesy, and user-friendliness. 
Understanding such valuesKHJRHVRQ WR VWDWH µDdds to the complexity of conceptualising 
administrative justice, not least because not all of these principles and values are consistent 
with each other, and are often contingent in their nature and application¶. Nonetheless, 
3DUWLQJWRQXUJHG WKDW µZH Vhould revisit [the existing] conceptual language not only to see 
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ZKHWKHULWLVVWLOODSSURSULDWH«EXWDOVR«WRVHHZKDWRWKHUYDOXHVDQGSULQFLSOHVQHHGWREH
EURXJKWLQWRWKHIUDPHZRUN¶His claim was, therefore, that: 
  
At the risk of making our lives more complex« any consideration of the structure of administrative 
justice cannot shy away from analysis of these competing values and principles. How they ultimately are 
summarized and packaged for public and political consumption is another matter; but that should not 
deter proper intellectual investigation of the range of values and principles which might be said to 
underpin the administrative justice system. 
 
This article highlights one way in which administrative justice has failed to supply the 
µSURSHU LQWHOOHFWXDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQ¶ LQWR YDOXHV FDOOHG IRU E\ 3DUWLQJWRQ 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKLV
article suggests that there remains space for reflection on the use of values talk itself in 
administrative justice, and that there is a need to refine the grammar of values in 
administrative justice (Gee and Webber 2013; Mashaw 2006). 
There are two main parts to the discussion here. The first part identifies a problem in the 
administrative justice debate: key values are often deployed, both in academic and policy 
contexts, without much precision. This can create analytical confusion. As such, it is 
suggested that there is scope for the further clarification of the various understandings and 
meanings that animate such values. The second part of the article offers an extended case 
study which demonstrates this need to reflect on the use of administrative justice values. The 
example used is the oft-referred-WR YDOXH RI µXVHU-fULHQGOLQHVV¶ RU EHLQJ µXVHU-IRFXVHG¶ In 
recent years, the UK Government and commentators alike have seen user-focus positively 
2¶%ULHQ  DQG UHVHDUFK LQVWLWXWHV DUH EXLOGLQJ DJHQGDV DURXQG WKH LGHD e.g. UKAJI 
D 8.$-, E ,QGHHG µXVHU-focuV¶ FRXOG EH VDLG WR QRZ EH D NH\ YDOXH RI
administrative justice, and it is often used as an aspirational normative standard (e.g. Sossin 
2017). This trend stands in stark contrast with the comments of Lord Reed in a recent UK 
Supreme Court (UKSC) decision concerning tribunal fees, where the government was 
criticised for emphasising users (R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51). These 
judicial comments are also indicative of a wider developing critique of terms such as µXsers¶, 
expressed by a range of FRPPHQWDWRUV 2¶%ULHQ  DQG LQ popular films such as Ken 
/RDFK¶V I, Daniel Blake (2016). This paper shows how this apparent disagreement about 
users can be illuminated by understanding that different concerns are often in play when the 
value RI µXVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV¶ is discussed. In light of this, the article proposes an important 
distinction²between what wiOOEHFDOOHGµDFFHVVLELOLW\¶DQGµFRQVXPHULVW¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI
user-focus²that is necessary for XQGHUVWDQGLQJWDONDERXWµXVHU-friendlineVV¶ 
As a preliminary issueWKHQRWLRQRIµgrDPPDU¶UHTXLUHVHODERUDWLRQ*rammar, at least in 
the non-technical sense it is used here, seeks to capture the words and phrases that are 
commonly deployed by a community about a particular subject (Gee and Webber 2013a). 
Here, the subject matter is administrative justice. The community is constituted of those who 
regularly discuss it²typically policymakers, researchers, advisors etc. And the particular 
interest of this article is in what we commonly refer to as the µYDOXHV¶ µFRQFHSWV¶ or 
µSULQFLSOHV¶ RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH. To be clear, words and phrases²value terms for our 
discussion²can be used to undertake a range of actions. They can be used to criticise and 
defend systems, practices, rules etc. They can also be used to understand and explain 
administrative justice. In this sense, the values of administrative justice, as discussed here, are 
VHHQ DV D µFRJQLWLYH WRRO¶ *HH DQG :HEEHU a). In the context of values, we must be 
particularly alert to the fact we are dealing with a language of abstractions. That is to say, 
values are non-material entities which operate at a high level of generality. Some 
administrative law scholars have expressed particular hostility to the use of this sort of 
language (e.g. Griffith 1979). The purpose of this article is not to fully explore the merits, or 
otherwise, of such hostility. Nonetheless, this article does indicate that, where abstract 
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language is used, a subsequent need to refine what is actually meant arises. As such, it may 
give us pause to reflect more deeply on the nature and use of abstractions in contemporary 
administrative law and justice thought (Gee and Webber 2013b). 
 
Why we need to reconsider the grammar of administrative justice values 
 
There has been no shortage of attempts to state the values that an administrative justice 
system ought to respect. Indeed, it was observed by the Administrative Justice and Tribunals 
&RXQFLO $-7& WKDW WKH8.KDVD µrich history of developing principles for administrative 
MXVWLFH¶  0DQ\ VWDWHPHQWV RI WKH YDOXHV RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH KDYH FRPH IURP
institutions which engage with and are (or were) part of the administrative justice system (for 
a detailed outline see AJTC 2010). Two prominent and relatively recent examples are the 
3DUOLDPHQWDU\DQG+HDOWK6HUYLFH2PEXGVPDQ¶V3+62Principles of Good Administration 
DQGWKH$-7&¶VPrinciples of Administrative Justice (2010b).  
7KH3+62¶VPrinciples of Good Administration set down a range of values intended not as 
µDFKHFNOLVW WREHDSSOLHGPHFKDQLFDOO\¶EXW DVSULQFLSOHV WKDWFRXOGDVVLVWSXEOLFERGLHV LQ
WDNLQJDFWLRQWKDWDFKLHYHVµUHDVRQDEOHIDLUDQGSURSRUWLRQDWHUHVXOWVLQ WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV¶
These principles formed part of a wider attempt by the PHSO to generate principles (see e.g. 
3+62E3+62F6L[SULQFLSOHVRIµJRRGDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶ZHUHRIIHUHGJHWWLQJLW
right; being customer focused; being open and accountable; acting fairly and proportionately; 
and putting things right; and seeking continuous improvement. These six principles²each 
explained through a few examples in the space of a few lines²were said to be informed by 
the experiences of the PSHO, with the introduction to the principles recognising that they 
µGUDZRQRYHU\HDUV¶H[SHULHQFHRILQYHVWLJDWLQJDQGUHSRUWLQJRQFRPSODLQWVWRSURSRVHD
FOHDUIUDPHZRUNZLWKLQZKLFKSXEOLFERGLHVVKRXOGVHHNWRZRUN¶ 
The now defunct AJTC was an advisory body with a statutory role to keep the 
administrative justice system under review, with the aim of making it fair, accessible, and 
efficient (Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, Schedule 7(13)(1)). In 2010, the 
AJTC produced a statement of Principles for Administrative Justice²principles which built 
µRQ SUHYLRXV ZRUN LQ WKLV ILHOG DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU RQ WKH 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ DQG +HDOWK 6HUYLFH
2PEXGVPDQ¶V Principles of Good Administration (these were reviewed as part of work in 
AJTC 2010). Richard Thomas CBE, the then Chairman of the AJTC, explained that the 
SULQFLSOHVZHUHµGHVLJQHGWREHXVHGE\RIILFLDOV LQSXEOLFERGLHVDQGEH\RQG«>W@KH\DOVR
DSSO\ WR WKRVH GHDOLQJ ZLWK FRPSODLQWV RU DSSHDOV¶ 0XFK OLNH WKH 3+62¶V SULQFLSOHV WKH
AJTC drew its principles from practical experience, via broad-based engagement with 
VWDNHKROGHUV $-7& E 7KH SULQFLSOHV VHW GRZQ E\ WKH $-7& VWDWHG WKDW D µJRRG
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHV\VWHP¶VKRXOGPDNHXVHUVDQGWKHLUQHHGVFHQWUDOWUHDWLQJWKHPZLWK
fairness and respect at all times; enable people to challenge decisions and seek redress using 
procedures that are independent, open and appropriate for the matter involved; keep people 
fully informed and empower them to resolve their problems as quickly and comprehensively 
as possible; lead to well-reasoned, lawful and timely outcomes;  be coherent and consistent; 
work proportionately and efficiently; and adopt the highest standards of behavior, seek to 
learn from experience and continuously improve. 
These statements of values, largely reflective of others which have been produced by 
various institutions in recent years, can potentially serve some role as a general aide to public 
bodies (whether they actually do is a question for another day). What is left without 
development in the principles are deeper, more reflective considerations of how such values 
DUH WREHXQGHUVWRRG)RU LQVWDQFH WKH3+62¶VSULQFLSOHV VWDWHXQGHU WKH UXEULFRI µDFWLQJ
IDLUO\ DQG SURSRUWLRQDOLW\¶ WKDW SHRSOH RXJKW WR EH WUHDWHG µLPSDUWLDOO\ ZLWK UHVSHFW DQG
FRXUWHV\¶ 7KLV EHJV VRPH LPSRUWDQW questions, including how are values such as 
µLPSDUWLDOLW\¶ WR EH XQGHUVWRRG LQ DQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH FRQWH[W" 7KLV FRPPHQW LV QR
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doubt, a cheap shot of sorts: this type of reflection would not be the sort of analysis of values 
that bodies such as the PSHO or AJTC would have any incentive (or time) to produce. 
However, documents such as Principles of Good Administration and Principles of 
Administrative Justice are often referred to as statements of administrative justice values, and 
it could be said they exert some impact on the shaping of administrative justice thought.  
More importantly, the way these documents discuss and deploy values is not too far from 
how academic literature does too. 
Looking to academic analysis, the values of administrative justice are occasionally 
reflected upon more deeply. For instance, such reflection can be found in the well-known 
ZRUNRQ WKH µPRGHOVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH¶E\0DVKDZDQG$GOHU 03). 
One recent, and clear, example is the work of Cowan et al, concerning the mandatory 
reconsideration system (2017). In the context of discussing values for redesigning the system, 
WKH\FRQVLGHUWKHYDOXHRIµDFFXUDF\¶7KH\VXJJHVWWKDWWKHYDOXHRIDFcuracy, in the context 
of decision-PDNLQJFRQFHUQVµDQDVFHUWDLQPHQWRIWKHIDFWVRIDFDVHVXIILFLHQWWRHQDEOHWKH
SXEOLF RIILFLDO SURSHUO\ WR DSSO\ WKH ODZ WR WKRVH IDFWV¶ 7KLV µHODERUDWLRQ¶ WKH\ VXJJHVW
DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW WKH YDOXH RI DFFXUDF\ µHPEUaces both the proper ascertainment of facts 
DQG WKH DSSURSULDWH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI ODZ¶ 7KLV VRUW RI FODULILFDWLRQ LV DV WKLV DUWLFOH LV
suggesting, helpful: it distills two distinct concerns about the actual process which, if spoken 
RI RQO\ DV µDFFXUDF\¶ Fould have been elided. But this sort of conceptual clarification 
remains rare and limited in the literature more generally. Far more common in the literature is 
the deployment of contested values without much, if any, acknowledgment of their contested 
nature (see Nason 2016 for further discussion of this). There is of course a great challenge in 
suggesting this to be a general problem with values talk in administrative justice scholarship: 
full evidence for such a claim would require a systematic analysis. In the stead of providing 
such an analysis here, I will refer to one recent example in this journal, which is indicative of 
WKH LVVXH 1DVRQ¶V ZRUN RQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH MXVWLFH LQ :DOHV  ,Q SDUWLFXODU 1DVRQ¶V
discussion of the various incarnations of the Wales Bill in 2015 and 2016, and their impact on 
administrative justice in Wales, provides a clear example. The 2015 Bill is criticised because 
LWVµORJLFDQGFRQVLVWHQF\ZHUHTXHVWLRQDEOH¶ The :DOHV%LOOLVVDLGQRWWREHµDFOHDU
and accessible SLHFHRI OHJLVODWLRQ¶7KHYDOXHVRI µFRQVLVWHQF\¶ µFRKHUHQFH¶ µFODULW\¶ DQG
µDFFHVVLELOLW\¶DUH all terms that could each represent a wide range of anxieties in the context 
they are being used.  To be clear, this is not to criticise a particular author. It is to highlight 
that general values talk is something almost all (including myself) and even the most 
reflective administrative justice researchers do. 
General values talk in administrative justice is thus a problem as it often leaves a lack of 
clarity that hampers discussion. Values are protean concepts and the same value can act as a 
label for a range of more specific concerns²concerns which are often overlapping but 
ultimately different. For H[DPSOHWKHYDOXHRIµWLPHOLQHVV¶FDQEHVHHQDVDPDQLIestation of a 
concern for efficient administration, the desire to reduce stress of those subject to a decision-
making procedure, or a variety of other concerns. There are multiple concerns which may 
therefore underlie the value of timeliness, and thus any discussion or claim that hinges upon 
LW7KLVPHDQV WKDWSXWYHU\VLPSO\DXWKRUVFDQEH WDONLQJDERXW WKHVDPHµYDOXHV¶EXW LQ
substance, talking about very different issues. This is particularly troublesome where terms 
are widely used. Mashaw, for instDQFHKDVVKRZQKRZWKHµPLOOLRQVRIZRUGVSLOOHGRQWKH
VXEMHFW RI DFFRXQWDELOLW\¶ FDQEH VKRZQ WREH VFKRODUV µWDONLQJDERXWGLIIHUHQWPHWKRGDQG
questions of accountability without specifying with any precision either the particular 
accountability problem that engages their attention or the choices they are making implicitly 
DPRQJGLIIHUHQWDFFRXQWDELOLW\UHJLPHV¶0DVKDZ 
While there is a strong case for further reflection on how we use the values of 
administrative justice, there is an important objection which could be made to such an 
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approach. Stated succinctly, that objection is that WKHFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKHDUJXPHQW¶VVXFFHVV
is the opening up of an abstract debate from which little may be gained in practice. In other 
words, WKHUH LV D µULVN RI PDNLQJ RXU OLYHV PRUH FRPSOH[¶ WKURXJK HQFRXUDJLQJ QLWSLFNLQJ
around values (Partington 1999). Public law more generally has perhaps fallen into this trap 
in recent years. *HHDQG:HEEHUDSSO\LQJ2DNHVKRWW¶VFRQFHUQDERXWWKHXVHRIUDtionalism 
WRFRQWHPSRUDU\SXEOLFODZLGHQWLI\DµSXVKZLWKLQWKHVWXG\RISXEOLFODZIRUDPRUH
UDWLRQDOLVHG IRUPDOLVHG DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHG FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶  7KLV µSXVK¶²RU µVHDUFK
IRUSULQFLSOH¶²could, they suggest, lend itself to two readings about the approach of public 
lawyers to their discipline. One is that it could be what Oakeshott feared come true in modern 
SXEOLFODZWKRXJKWLWEHLQJV\PSWRPDWLFRIDµUDWLRQDOLVWLFSURSHQVLW\DPRQJSXEOLFODZ\HUV
to prioritise the universal over the local, the uniform over the particular and, ultimately, 
SULQFLSOH RYHU SUDFWLFH« FXOPLQDW>LQJ@ LQ SXEOLF ODZ\HUV ORVLQJ WKH DELOLW\ WR GLIIHUHQWLDWH
EHWZHHQWKHIUDLOW\RIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDQGWKHIUDLOW\RIWKHLURZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILW¶
AnotheU PRUH SRVLWLYH UHDGLQJ RI WKH UDWLRQDOLVWLF µSXVK¶ ZLWKLQ SXElic law is that it is 
µHYLGHQFH RI >DQ@ LQFUHDVLQJ VRSKLVWLFDWLRQ DQG VXUHIRRWHGQHVV¶ LQ WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ of a 
public law system which emerged out of haphazard FRQGLWLRQV *HH DQG :HEEHU¶V FHntral 
WKHVLV LV WKDW WKH RSWLPXP DSSURDFK LQ SXEOLF ODZ LV LQ WKH µVHDUFK IRU SULQFLSOH¶ WR EH
µVHQVLWLYH WR WKH SODFH RI SUDFWLFDO NQRZOHGJH¶ ,Q UHILQLQJ WKH JUDPPDU RI DGPLQLVWUDWLYH
justice values²which this article suggests would be a helpful pursuit²there is need for 
caution not to wander into the territory of having a rationalistic debate. The administrative 
justice corner of the public law field has not been afflicted by such excessive rationalism. 
This may largely be due to the socio-legal approach many of the scholars occupying the field 
have adhered to in recent decades not providing a fertile space for such work. Indeed, 
administrative justice has, as this article suggests, had the contrary problem: it has neglected 
clarity when it has used concepts. The benefits of conceptual clarity can be seen in looking at 
the contemporary scholarship on public law generally, and particularly constitutional law. 
While, as Gee and Webber demonstrate, the field has succumbed to some of the problems 
associated with rationalism, it has also gained a greater awareness of the fact that the 
language of values is inherently general and ambiguous. A great deal of attention has, for 
instance, been given to elucidating the fundamental values of the Rule of Law, the separation 
of powers, and democracy (often discussed in terms of legislative sovereignty). There are 
many possible examples of the benefits of this awareness. Here, the recent case of R (Evans) 
v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 2 will be discussed. 
Evans revolved around the advocacy activities of Prince Charles. He would, from time to 
time, send letters to Ministers to express his stance on various government policies. This 
FRUUHVSRQGHQFHEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKHµEODFN-VSLGHUPHPRV¶$FDWFK\VRPHZKDWPHQDFLQJ
taglinHZLWKDEDQDOFDXVH3ULQFH&KDUOHV¶VFKRLFHRILQNDQGSDUWLFXODUVW\OHRIKDQGZULWLQJ
Mr. Evans, a journalist, sought to use the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) in order 
to bring these memos into the public domain. Subsequent to various departments declining to 
release the letters on public interest grounds, Mr. Evans went to the Information 
Commissioner. The letters were still not released. The resistance to the release of the letters 
finally broke in the Upper Tribunal (Evans v Information Commissioner [2012] UKUT 313 
(AAC)). In a remarkably meticulous judgment which gave detailed consideration of 
constitutional conventions concerning the role of the heir to the throne (see generally: 
Murray, 2013), the UT held that the public interest justified the release of the letters. After 
WKDW MXGJPHQW WKH *RYHUQPHQW VSHFLILFDOO\ WKH $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO XVHG LWV µYHWR¶ SRZHU
FRQWDLQHG LQ VHFWLRQ  RI WKH )2,$ LVVXLQJ D FHUWLILFDWH FODLPLQJ WKDW LW KDG µUHDVRQDEOH
JURXQGV¶ IRU KDYLQJ IRUPHG WKH RSLQLRQ What non-disclosure would not be unlawful. The 
*RYHUQPHQWWKXVVRXJKWWRHQGWKHHIIHFWRIWKH87¶VRUGHU7KHFDVHWKHQZHQWRQWRMXGLFLDO
review, where Mr. Evans went from failure in the Administrative Court (R (Evans) v Attorney 
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General [2013] EWHC 1960 (Admin)) to success in the Court of Appeal (R (Evans) v 
Attorney General [2014] EWCA Civ 254 7KH VWDJH ZDV WKXV VHW IRU D µFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
EORFNEXVWHU¶ LQ WKH 8.6& (OOLRWW D 7KH TXHVWLRQ ZDV XOWLPDWHO\ D FOHDU RQH RI
VWDWXWRU\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ ZDV WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V YHWR intra vires section 53? The reasoning 
within the UKSC took three paths (R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] 2 
WLR 813). The majority in the UKSC was made up of two lines of reasoning. Lord 
Neuberger, with Lord Kerr and Lord Reed, read section 53 so that the Attorney General had 
no power to overrule the Tribunal, rendering the certificate unlawful. Lord Mance, supported 
E\/DG\+DOHUHMHFWHG/RUG1HXEHUJHU¶VDSSURDFKEXWKHOGWKDWWKH$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOFRXOG
QRWRYHUUXOHWKH87¶VILQGLQJV/RUG+XJKHVDQG/RUG:LOVRQGLVVHQWHG7KH\KHOGVHFWLRQ
53 could only be read as authorising the Attorney General to override the UT in situations 
where he took a different view of the public interest. Divisions about the correct approach to 
statutory interpretation were readily apparent. The various approaches within the UKSC were 
attacked and defended by a range of commentators (see e.g. Ekins and Forsyth 2015; Elliott 
2015a; Fairclough 2017; Allan 2016). The validity of the different positions set out by the 
many commentators who had something to say about Evans is immaterLDO WR WKLV DUWLFOH¶V
argument. What is material is that these arguments traded on and were informed by a clear 
understanding that core constitutional values²particularly parliamentary sovereignty, the 
Rule of Law, and the separation of powers²are widely contested as to their content and 
relationship. The whole debate around Evans was shot through with a clear awareness that 
µVXFKTXHVWLRQV>DVWKRVHLQWKHFDVH@GRQRWDGPLWRIVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDQVZHUV¶EXWWKDWWKH\
µIRUPVLWHVRIFRQWURYHUV\¶ZLWKµKRZWhey fall to be approached being coloured heavily by 
WKH XQGHUO\LQJ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SHUVSHFWLYH WKDW RQH DGRSWV¶ (OOLRWW D). For instance, 
Elliott (2015a) highlights how Evans speaks to disagreement about the values of 
parliamentary sovereignty, the Rule of Law, and separation of powers: 
The basic architecture of the constitution consists of a series of relational principles. They make subtle, 
overlapping, sometimes-contradictory, sometimes-complementary claims. None of them stands for a 
simple proposition, and the degree of complexity that they exhibit when viewed in isolation is multiplied 
when they are²as they must be²conceived of in relational terms. For this reason, a large part of the 
complexity of constitutional adjudication in cases such as Evans derives from the need to determine not 
simply what these fundamental principles mean, but how they interact with, qualify and inform 
prevailing conceptions of one another. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable scope for differences of view 
in relation to such matters, as Evans amply attests. Those differences are manifested not only by the very 
different positions adopted by the majority and minority judges, but by highly significant differences of 
emphasis within the majority. 
In understanding such the lack of clarity around constitutional values talk, the constitutional 
law debate has found itself in place to recognise that a range of different underlying concerns 
operate beneath general labels. Similar awareness about the lack of clarity in values talk in 
administrative justice would be a welcome development. 
Overall, there is a need to revisit the grammar of administrative justice values, and to 
refine it. The alternative is a debate which suffers from a problematic lack of clarity. This is 
not to call for a nitpicking and needlessly complex discussion of what various values mean. 
Instead, this is to call for more clarification and care when various values are deployed. A 
detailed case study is useful to explain, in a more concrete way, how such clarification on the 
values of administrative justice may assist debate. The next section will focus on the value of 
µXVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV¶DPDMRUVLWHRIGLVDJUHHPHQWLQUHFHQW\HDUV 
 
7KHWXUQWRµXVHUV¶LQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHUHYLVLWLQJWKHYDOXHRIµXVHU-
IULHQGOLQHVV¶ 
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In UK administrative justice circles, it would be easy to get the impression that we are all 
µXVHU-IRFXVHG¶ QRZ 3DUWLFXODUO\ VLQFH WKH  :KLWH 3DSHU RQ Transforming Public 
Services, the parts of the government concerned with administrative justice (notably the 
Ministry of Justice and HM Courts and Tribunals Service) have consistently spoken of 
building tribunals and other administrative justice systems to fit user needs. There is no sign 
of change here either. A policy document published in late 2016²Transforming Our Justice 
System²announced a huge investment in the justice system and set out, among other things, 
a vision for online tribunals (Tomlinson 2017). Part of this vision involved online tribunals 
EHLQJ µVSHFLILFDOO\GHVLJQHG WRPHHWXVHUQHHGV¶DQGV\VWHPV µIRFXVHGDURXQG WKHQHHGVRI
LQGLYLGXDOVVRWKDWFODLPDQWVFDQEHPRUHFRQILGHQWWKDWWKHLUQHHGVZLOOEHXQGHUVWRRG¶02-
2016). Government departments, including the Ministry of Justice, are even adopting µDJLOH¶
RUµGHVLJQWKLQNLQJ¶DSSURDFKHVZKLFKXVHWHFKQLTXHVpremised on the value of user-focused 
design (Kimbell and Bailey 2017). Often, commentators have seen user-focus positively (e.g. 
2¶%ULHQDQGUHVHDUFKLQVWLWXWHVDUHEXLOGLQJDJHQGDVDURXQGWKHGRLQJµXVHUUHVHDUFK¶
8.$-, D 8.$-, E µ%HLQJ XVHU-IRFXVHG¶²RU SHUKDSV PRUH VLPSO\ µXVHU-
IULHQGOLQHVV¶²could be said to now be a key value of administrative justice, and is often used 
as an aspirational normative standard (e.g. Sossin 2017). While there is a growing²if still 
small²body of academic literature on users (Partington 2017), there has been little 
discussion about user-friendliness as a value, even though it is often used as such. There is, in 
WKHILUVWLQVWDQFHWKHEDVLFTXHVWLRQRIZKRLVWKHµXVHU¶"7KLVFRXOGEHDOD\XVHUDODZ\HU
some other professional user (such as a welfare advisor), or even a judge. Typically, the term 
µuser¶ relates to the lay user. But, putting that question aside and adopting its usual meaning 
of focus on the lay user for the sake of discussion, the concept of IRUµXVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV¶can 
represent multiple different ideas. This was particularly evident in the recent UKSC decision 
in UNISON, which appeared to offer a critique of focusing on users.  
UNISON has some trademark features of an instant classic in public law²it being high-
profile in mainstream media (e.g. Hughes 2017), carrying significant practical effects (in 
terms of the reimbursement of tribunal fees paid under an unlawful scheme and the removal 
of the fee going forwards), and advancing in-vogue talk of common law constitutional rights 
(Elliott 2015b). The legal issue at stake was, much like Evans, relatively simple. Section 42 
of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides that µ>W@KH/RUG&KDQFHOORUPD\
E\RUGHUSUHVFULEH IHHV SD\DEOH LQ UHVSHFW RI¶YDULRXV WULEXQDOV LQFOXGLQJ WKH (PSOR\PHnt 
Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal. In 2013, Chris Grayling, the then Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, used the section 42 power to make the 
Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013 (SI 
2013/1893). The effect of that Order was²stating in a broad fashion²that most people who 
wished to make use of the Employment Tribunals had to pay fees where, previously, no such 
fees had been payable. This led to a dramatic and sustained drop in the number of claims 
lodged in Employment Tribunals. There are three ways to measure of demand for 
employment tribunals: volume of cases, volume of claims, and volume of jurisdictional 
complaints (Adams and Prassl 2017) Demand fell significantly upon the introduction of the 
fees, whichever of these metrics is used (Adams and Prassl 2017). Overall, claims dropped by 
nearly 80% with the introduction of fees (MOJ 2012; MOJ 2015). The core legal issue before 
the UKSC whether the Order was lawful.  
UNISON argued successfully that the Order was unlawful (having failed to win in the 
High Court and Court of Appeal)²with their central argument being that the Order impeded 
DFFHVVWRMXVWLFHDQGWKDWWKH/RUG&KDQFHOORU¶VRUGHU-making power, granted by section 42 
of the Act, did not extend to impeding such access. At the heart of the case, therefore, was a 
question of statutory interpretation. Given the nature of the claim, issues of fundamental 
constitutional principle were engaged as part of the interpretive exercise. The UKSC offered 
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a clear, unanimous judgment. In delivering the judgment of the Court, Lord Reed, in a 
SDVVDJHRQWKHµFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKW¶WRDFFHVVWRMXVWLFHVWDWHGWKHIROORZLQJ 
 
The importance of the rule of law is not always understood. Indications of a lack of understanding 
include the assumption that the administration of justice is merely a public service like any other, that 
FRXUWV DQG WULEXQDOV DUH SURYLGHUV RI VHUYLFHV WR WKH µXVHUV¶ ZKR DSSHDU EHIRUH WKHP DQG WKDW WKH
provision of those services is of value only to the users themselves and to those who are remunerated for 
their participation in the proceedings. The extent to which that viewpoint has gained currency in recent 
times is apparent from the consultation papers and reports discussed earlier. It is epitomised in the 
assumption that the consumption of ET and EAT services without full cost recovery results in a loss to 
VRFLHW\ VLQFH µ(7DQG($7XVHGRHV QRW OHDG WRJDLQV WR VRFLHW\ WKDW H[FHHG WKH VXP RI WKH JDLQV WR
consumers and producers of thesHVHUYLFHV¶ (UNISON para. 66). 
 2QWKHEDFNRIWKHVHREVHUYDWLRQV/RUG5HHGZHQWRQWRH[SODLQµWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHUXOH
RIODZDQGWKHUROHRIDFFHVV WR WKHFRXUWV LQPDLQWDLQLQJWKHUXOHRIODZ¶DQGZK\ LQKLV
YLHZµWKHLGHDWKDWEULQJLQJDFODLPbefore a court or a tribunal is a purely private activity, 
and the related idea that such claims provide no broader social benefit, are demonstrably 
unteQDEOH¶+HIXUWKHUHGH[SODLQHGWKDWµFRXUWVH[LVWLQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHODZVPDGHE\
Parliament, DQGWKHFRPPRQODZFUHDWHGE\WKHFRXUWVWKHPVHOYHVDUHDSSOLHGDQGHQIRUFHG¶
DQGWKDWIXQFWLRQµLQFOXGHVHQVXULQJWKDW WKHH[HFXWLYHEUDQFKRIJRYHUQPHQWFDUULHVRXW LWV
IXQFWLRQV LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH ODZ¶ 7KLV IXQFWLRQ RI FRXUWV ZDV VDLG WR HQWDLO WKe 
UHTXLUHPHQW WKDW µSHRSOH PXVW LQ SULQFLSOH KDYH XQLPSHGHG DFFHVV WR WKHP :LWKRXW VXFK
access, laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered 
nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless 
FKDUDGH¶ SDUD  7KDW KH H[SODLQV LV ZK\ µWKH FRXUWV GR QRW PHUHO\ SURYLGH D SXEOLF
VHUYLFHOLNHDQ\RWKHU«>D@FFHVVWRWKHFRXUWVLVQRWWKHUHIRUHRIYDOXHRQO\WRWKHSDUWLFXODU
LQGLYLGXDOVLQYROYHG¶DQGµ>W@KDWLVPRVWREYLRXVO\WUue of cases which establish principles of 
geQHUDOLPSRUWDQFH¶/RUG5HHG¶VFRPPHQWVVHHPWRVXJJHVWWKDWIRFXVLQJRQXVHUVGRHVQRW
lead us to a better justice system, but to one where the UKSC feels the need to reprimand the 
executive and provide a Rule of Law 101.   
$W WKH KHDUW RI /RUG 5HHG¶V critique of the government is that, in their assessment of 
whether tribunals fees were a good idea, it focused too much on users as consumers of legal 
services and did not focus enough on the wider role that a user may play as a citizen in the 
maintenance a good political community (through, in this instance, bringing a claim to a 
tribunal). Such an underlying mode of thought is apparent in multiple comments²perhaps 
PRVWQRWDEO\ZKHUHKHFULWLFLVHVWKHDOOHJHGµassumption [on the part of the government] that 
the administration of justice is merely a public service like any other, that courts and tribunals 
DUHSURYLGHUVRI VHUYLFHV WR WKH µXVHUV¶ZKRDSSHDUEHIRUH WKHP¶. As a somewhat technical 
DVLGH /RUG 5HHG¶V FULWLque seems to be unduly sweeping in this case. The quote of the 
government referred to by Lord Reed²WKDW µ(7 DQG ($7 XVH GRHV QRW OHDG WR JDLQV WR
VRFLHW\WKDWH[FHHGWKHVXPRIWKHJDLQVWRFRQVXPHUVDQGSURGXFHUVRIWKHVHVHUYLFHV¶²does 
not make the claim WKDW WKH HPSOR\PHQW WULEXQDOV µprovide no brRDGHU VRFLDO EHQHILW¶ 
Instead, it shows a balancing exercise where the broader social benefit has been recognised as 
SDUWRIDYDOXHMXGJPHQW(YHQLILWKDGQRWEHHQJLYHQHQRXJKZHLJKWLQ/RUG5HHG¶VYLHZLW
would be too far to suggest the government did not recognise the social benefit the justice 
V\VWHPFDQSURYLGH)XUWKHUPRUHDNH\HOHPHQWRIWKH8.6&¶VMXGJPHQWLVWKDWWULEXQDOIHHV
had the effect of disadvantaging users accessing justice or, in other words, hampering users. 
It therefore seems that a more accurate criticism would be that the government pursued a 
policy on a misunderstanding of user needs, or in denial of negative impacts on users. 
However, WKDW SRLQW DVLGH /RUG 5HHG¶V FRPPHQWV²when placed next to the generally 
positive way user-focus has been perceived in many quarters²presents some obvious 
tensions within WKHYDOXHRIµXVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV¶. 
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The pUREOHP DSSHDUV WR EH WKDW ZKHQ µXVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV¶ is deployed, it can represent 
multiple²and contradictory²understandings. There are at least two understandings which 
are commonly adopted. The first is that user-focus conceives the justice system as a private 
product for consumption by the individual (and not as a system where individuals can partake 
LQ WKH VWDWH¶V SXEOLF GHFLVLRQ-making processes). We can call this the µFRQVXPHULVW¶
understanding. The second understanding is that the system should be convenient, accessible, 
DQG VLPSOH IRU OD\XVHUV:HFDQFDOO WKLV WKH µDFFHVVLELOLW\¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJ. Clarifying and 
drawing a distinction between these two aspects of the notion of being user focused²by 
articulating the more specific meaning²may assist the administrative justice debate.  
This distinction, by way of continued example, can KHOSXVPDNH VHQVH RI /RUG5HHG¶V
comments on the perils of user-emphasis in UNISON. $V H[SODLQHG DERYH /RUG 5HHG¶V
comments present a tension. On the one hand, many concerned with administrative justice 
KDYHFKDPSLRQHGµXVHUIRFXV¶DVDPHDQVof improving access to justice. In this light, Lord 
5HHG¶V critique aimed towards user-focus would seem odd. It would seem especially odd 
given that the critique was offered as part of a wider discussion of the importance of the 
constitutional right of access to justice. But if we recognise that the concept of user-
friendliness represents more than only the accessibility XQGHUVWDQGLQJ /RUG 5HHG¶V
comments can be clarified. Specifically, they can be read as a concern about the consumerist 
understanding of user focus. This reading is support by numerous points of the judgment. 
Lord Reed GHQRXQFHVWKHLGHDWKDWµbringing a claim before a court or a tribunal is a purely 
SULYDWHDFWLYLW\¶. He also speaks about ways in which court cases²such as the landmark tort 
case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100²DUHQRWRQO\µRIYDOXH«WRWKHSDUWLcular 
LQGLYLGXDOV LQYROYHG¶ EXW DOVR Wo the wider community. He directly speaks of the role of 
citizen in forming the law which regulates WKH FRPPXQLW\ WKDW EHLQJ VDLG WR EH µPRVW
obviously true of cases which establish principles oI JHQHUDO LPSRUWDQFH¶. All of those 
comments map onto a concern about µXVHU-IULHQGOLQHVV¶ in its consumerist sense. 
UndHUVWDQGLQJ /RUG 5HHG¶V MXGJPHQW on those terms therefore allows us to reconcile his 
critique of user-focus with the fact that the critique is situated in a discussion about the 
constitutional right of access to justice.  
The size of the possible gap between these two faces of the same concept²user-focus²is 
evident in two articles E\ 2¶%ULHQ, published in The Political Quarterly in 2012 and 2017 
respectively. In the former DUWLFOH2¶%ULHQUHIOHFWVRQWKH2010-&RDOLWLRQ*RYHUQPHQW¶V
proposal to abolish the AJTC. At times, he casts the value of user-focus in a positive light. In 
the following passage for instance, it forms part of his regret about the demise of the AJTC 
DQGµLWVYLVLRQRIDWUDQVIRUPHGDQGWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOIXWXUH¶that ZDVWREHµFRQVLJQHGWRWKH
:KLWHKDOODUFKLYHV¶: 
7KH&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRDEROLVKWKH$GPLQLVWUDWLYH-XVWLFHDQG7ULEXQDOV&RXQFLO$-7&
in its Public Bodies Bill (now the Public Bodies Act 2011) brings to an end a brief period during which 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHKDGVHHPLQJO\FRPHRIDJH7KHSUHYLRXVJRYHUQPHQW¶V:KLWH3DSHUTrans- 
forming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals for the first time in more than a generation 
had set out a vision for administrative justice that aimed to give it parity with civil and family justice: it 
VSRNHDPELWLRXVO\RIDQDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHµV\VWHP¶WKDWZRXOGFRPSULVHQRWMXVWFRXUWVDQGWULEXQDOV
but ombudsmen and departmental first-instance decision makers, too; it proposed as the guiding principle 
foUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKLVµV\VWHP¶WKHSULQFLSOHRIµSURSRUWLRQDWHGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQ¶LQeffect applying 
WRDGPLQLVWUDWLYHMXVWLFHDµKRUVHVIRUFRXUVHV¶SKLORVRSK\DQGLWHOHYDWHGWKHµXVHU¶RIWKHV\VWHPWRD
position of pre- eminence at the expense of judges and administrators, for whose benefit other parts of 
the judicial system seem so often to have been organised.  
In same article, there is also worry about the notion of user-focus: 
The price, so far as administrative justice in particular is concerned, has been the adoption of a 
predominantly consumerist approach to justice that, whatever its merits in other fields, in the arena of 
public law diminishes the status of the actors, both individual citizen and state, by reducing them merely 
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to the purchasers of dispute resolution services. The idea that there might be a public interest in the 
relationship between state and citizen that eludes the easy categories of a consumer transaction and that 
invites solutions that are not rigorously instrumental or pragmatic is in this, as in so many other areas of 
RQFHµSXEOLF¶OLIHODUJHO\DOLen to the zeitgeist. The conseFUDWLRQRIµWKHXVHU¶DVSDUWRIWKHµQHZSXEOLF
PDQDJHPHQW¶HWKRVKDVQRGRXEWLQWURGXFHGDZHOFRPHUH-balancing of priorities in favour of an element 
RI µFXVWRPHU IRFXV¶ EXW WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW WKH ZRUG µFXVWRPHU¶ PLJKW LQ WKLV LQVWDQFHEH DPHWDSKRU
seems not to have much currency.  
In his 2017 article, 2¶%ULHQ revisits similar themes via a review of the Ken Loach film I, 
Daniel Blake (2016). The film follows the character of Daniel Blake. It depicts his troubled 
interactions with the Department for Work and Pensions, concluding with his death from a 
heart attack as he waits at the door of a delayed tribunal hearing. ,QWKHILOP¶VILQDOVFHQHa 
passage written by Blake is read out at his funeral: 
 
I am not a client, a customer, nor a service user. I am not a shirker, a scrounger, a beggar nor a thief. I am 
not a national insurance number, nor a blip on a screen. I paid my dues, never a penny short, and proud to 
GRVR,GRQ¶WWXJWKHIRUHORFNEXWORRNP\QHLJKERXULQWKHH\H,GRQ¶WDFFHSWRUVHHNFKDULW\0\QDPH
is Daniel Blake, I am a man, not a dog. As such, I demand my rights. I demand you treat me with respect. 
I, Daniel Blake, am a citizen, nothing more, nothing less. Thank you. 
Drawing upon this impassioned message of rage against bureaucratic despair, 2¶%ULHQ
suggests it²and the message of the film more generally²provides cause to pursue a 
µUHLPDJLQHGVHQVHRIFLWL]HQVKLS¶ in the administrative justice sphere. +HDUJXHVWKDWµDaniel 
%ODNH¶VµPDQLIHVWR¶LVVWURQJLQLWVLQVLVWHQFHWKDWµFLWL]HQVKLS¶PXVWVXSHUVHGHRWKHUZD\VRI
characterising the relationship between the individual and the state, especially those informed 
by the language of the market-place: the depiction of the indiYLGXDODVµFOLHQW¶µFXVWRPHU¶RU
µVHUYLFH-XVHU¶ LV DV D UHVXOW WR EH DEDQGRQHG¶ In these passages and across both articles, 
2¶%ULHQ ZUHVWOHV ZLWK WKH WHQVLRQV within the value of being user-focused. He ultimately 
engages with both of its contradictory understandings: his apparent desire to welcome its 
recognition of accessibility concerns are coupled with a deep-seated reluctance to acquiesce 
to the consumerist understanding of user-focus. 
This case study of the value of user-friendliness is brief but it highlights how talk of key 
values in administrative justice may benefit from further reflection of the sort which this 
article has argued there is an important role for. 7KHQRWLRQRIµXVHUIRFXV¶LVMXVWRQHLQVWDQFH
of where the grammar surrounding administrative justice lacks clarity, however, the strongly 
contradictory understandings of µuser-focus¶RXWOLQHGDERYH demonstrates the imperative to 
be specific in articulating the underlying concerns when the concept is used. In its general 
form, the concept is a placeholder for at least two sharply contrasting meanings.  
 
Conclusion 
 1HDUO\WZHQW\\HDUVRQIURP3DUWLQJWRQ¶VODQGPDUNµ5HFRQVWUXFWLQJ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH-XVWLFH¶
lecture, there have been multiple attempts to state important values in administrative justice 
and much reliance of values in analysis. There has, however, been a persistent failing in this 
values talk: key values are often deployed, both in academic and policy contexts, without 
much precision. This can create analytical confusion which hinders debate. The solution 
proposed here is to recognise the need to reflect upon and refine the current grammar of 
administrative justice values. In other words, we should seek to specify the particular 
concerns which typically underlie these values²these values often being a placeholder for a 
range of often overlapping but ultimately different concerns. This article has sought to 
demonstrate this problem and proposed solution in the context of concerns about the value of 
user-friendliness. In this respect, it has been shown that underlying the often-used notion of 
 12 
user-friendliness are two sharply contrasting understandings. In this context, general values 
talk has led to conceptual confusion about the matter that is the subject of disagreement.  
There is a question which this analysis puts firmly on the table, but leaves unresolved: are 
abstractions helpful at all in administrative law and justice debates? One argument could be 
that, given the need this article has identified to refine abstract values language, it is more 
useful just to avoid such language altogether. JAG Griffith²no doubt among the greatest 
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHODZ\HUVLQWKHVXEMHFW¶VUHODWLYHO\VKRUWKLVWRU\LQWKH8.²railed against the 
XVHRIDEVWUDFWLRQV +HFRQGHPQHG WKH µHODERUDWH IDFDGHV¶RI ODQJXDJH µGHOLEHUDWHO\
constructed to fool most of the people most of WKHWLPH¶DQGWKHµRXWRIGDWHSLHFHRIVWDJH
paraphernalia which someone had forgotten to clear away with the other impediments of 
3URIHVVRU'LFH\¶V(QJODQG¶. There are many examples of Griffith expressing concern about 
KRZµWKHQDWXUDOODZ\HUVWKHPHWDSK\VLFLDQVDQGWKHLOOXVLRQLVWV¶traded on abstractions. The 
functionalist tradition that Griffith was a part of consistently cautioned of the dangers of 
getting bound up in concepts at the expense of material substance (Loughlin 2005). This is 
not a position without hazard, though: some have expressed concern that materialism and 
empiricism²ZKLFKPD\EHFDULFDWXUHGDVDµFROG-H\HGEXGJHWDU\DSSURDFK¶²can go without 
the benefits WKDW DWWDFK RQO\ WR µHPSKDWLFDOO\ QRUPDWLYH¶ theorising (Waldron 2013). This 
article has addressed a different question and it is not the place to rehearse the full arguments 
around this point, but the analysis here does suggest this is an issue ripe for further 
exploration in the administrative law and justice context (Gee and Webber 2013b). 
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